【CEMA研讨会2018年秋季第三讲】

论文题目：Collaboration with constrained network formation

报告人：崔志伟

论文摘要：This paper develops a stochastic learning model in which agents choose a limited number of partners to play minimum-effort games. The payoff for each agent in this interaction depends on the minimum effort of their partners and herself, and is increasing with the size of her interaction neighborhood. When agents only interact with those to whom they actively form links, the long-run outcome is contingent on the linking constraint and the marginal payoff from coordination. A restrictive linking constraint or a relatively high marginal payoff from coordinating on high effort levels facilitate efficient coordinations. When agents interact with everyone with whom they have a link, whoever forms it, coordination on low effort is uniquely selected in the long run as long as every agent can support more than one link. If the payoff function is size-independent, agents will always coordinate on high effort, regardless of whether the interaction is unilateral or bilateral.

时间：9月19日（周三）中午11:30-13:00

地点：学院南路校区学术会堂712

报告人简介：崔志伟，北京航空航天大学经济管理学院数量经济与商务统计系副教授，2009年获得浙江大学应用数学博士学位。主要研究领域包括博弈论及其应用（博弈学习理论）、社会网络与经济行为理论等，研究成果发表于Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization，Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control，Journal of Mathematical Economics，International Journal of Game Theory，Journal of Theoretical Economics，《中国管理科学》等经济学学术期刊。

主办：中国经济与管理研究院

[编辑]：孙颖