讲座人： 李青原 教授

讲座主题：Political Investment Cycle of State Owned Enterprises

摘要：Abundant prior literature has examined the difference in efficiency between state-owned enterprises (SOEs thereafter) and non-SOEs, and the literature’s explanation for such a difference is that SOEs have multiple goals, and politicians’ control over SOEs enables them to fulfill their own political goals. Consistent with this explanation, based on a large international sample of SOEs, this paper provides the first cross-country, firm-level empirical evidence about political influences on SOEs. It shows that during national election years, corporate investment by SOEs increases by an average of 20.69%. We hypothesize that SOEs need to borrow from state-owned banks to finance the politically-motivated investment projects and find SOEs significantly increase bank loan level in election years, especially in countries with state-dominated banking systems. Last, since employment rate is another important factor deciding the election outcomes, we predict and find SOEs’ employment increases significantly during national election years. Overall, our results suggest that in election years, incumbent government uses SOEs for its political goals by increasing corporate investment and financing it via a state-dominated banking system.

讲座时间：2016年11月18日，周五，13:30开始

讲座地点：学院南路学术会堂604

讲座人简介：李青原，武汉大学经济与管理学院珞珈特聘教授、博士生导师、会计系主任。主持多项国家自然科学基金项目。目前已在The Accounting Review、Contemporary Accounting Research、Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance、China Accounting and Finance Review、China Journal of Accounting Studies、《管理世界》《经济学（季刊）》《会计研究》《金融研究》《审计研究》《南开管理评论》等国内外知名期刊发表三十余篇学术论文。

[编辑]：张萌